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‘Unfortunately we weren’t lucky that day and it didn’t 
happen to Lula’, Roberto told us. Roberto is a successful 
businessman who sells insurance policies from his office 
in Brasília. The lack of luck he is referring to concerns a 
helicopter crash that took place in São Paulo in 2015. Five 
people died in the crash, including Thomaz Alckmin, the 
son of São Paulo’s governor, Geraldo Alckmin. Roberto is 
very straightforward about his views: ‘Thomaz Alckmin 
had nothing to do with this’ (suggesting that Thomaz 
Alckmin did not play a role in the political conflicts his 
father has been involved in). Roberto goes on to argue 
that former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is not so 
innocent however, and that he is the one who should have 
been on that fatal flight. Roberto alleges that the heli-
copter belonged to one of Brazil’s largest financial service 
companies. The company always invited President Lula to 
spend New Year’s Eve on a company-owned island off the 
coast of São Paulo and what Roberto finds unfortunate is 
that although Lula regularly took that same helicopter, it 
never crashed when he was a passenger.
The contention between Alckmin and Lula goes a long 
way back. In addition to having once been the governor 
of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin is currently the leader of 
PSDB, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party. In 2006, he 
unsuccessfully ran for president against the incumbent 
president, Lula, and is running again in this year’s presi-
dential elections. Lula, who was Brazil’s president from 
2003 to 2011 for PT, the Worker’s Party, is also running 
in the October elections, although his candidacy hangs 
in the balance. In July 2017, Lula was convicted of cor-
ruption and money laundering in relation to receiving a 
seaside apartment worth over half a million pounds from 
a construction company. In January 2018, Lula lost his 
first appeal and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. 
In April, the Supreme Court ruled that he would have to 
await his second appeal in jail. Because Lula is in prison, 
it is yet to be decided if he can officially campaign for 
October’s elections.
Lula’s PT and Alckmin’s PSDB parties are bitter polit-
ical rivals and Roberto’s account of the helicopter crash 
clearly reveals where his political allegiances lie. Roberto 
is a friendly and helpful man. When we met him in his 
office, he offered us coffee and water and made sure we 
felt comfortable and welcome. His tone of voice was 
friendly, despite conveying a strong message. We were 
struck by the level of aggression in his account of the 
helicopter crash. For Roberto, it is not enough for Lula 
to have been convicted of corruption: Roberto actually 
thinks it a shame that Lula was not on that fatal flight. 
Roberto’s hostility is not uncommon. At political protests 
against PT, some protesters wear masks depicting Lula 
as a zombie with white skin and hair and blood running 
out of his mouth. On the forehead of the mask there is 
a circle resembling a shooting target inscribed with the 
words ‘FORA ZUMBI’, meaning ‘get out zombie’. The 
protesters want the undead gone.
Lula and the poor
At these protests, in conversations and especially on social 
media (WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook), we came 
across many vicious attacks against Lula. Where does this 
aggression come from and what are these attacks about? 
Why is it that Lula has been given an almost iconic status 
around which such aggression crystallizes? We believe 
these attacks do not simply reflect people’s hatred towards 
corruption. We argue that the memes not only reveal class 
subjectivities and identities, but also construct these 
by dehumanizing the poor. The memes and their sur-
rounding conversations do not identify which class posi-
tions the people posting them associate themselves with. 
Instead, they use ridicule to point out which positions 
they definitely do not associate with – namely, the poor 
or previously poor population that Lula represents. The 
international anti-corruption discourse (nobody will argue 
that corruption is permissible) legitimizes expressions of 
hatred towards Lula and the criminalization of the poor 
people he represents.
It is well known that Lula grew up in poverty. His par-
ents were sharecroppers in Pernambuco, a Northeastern 
state of Brazil, before migrating to São Paulo in the 
1950s. From an early age, Lula supplemented his family’s 
income by working as a shoeshiner, street vendor and then 
factory worker. The conditions in which he grew up meant 
that he had little formal education. And yet, it was Lula’s 
background that was decisive in winning him the presi-
dency, because it garnered the political support of those 
Brazilians who, just like him, lived in poverty. 
Lula’s ascension to the highest position in the country 
was a watershed moment. The office of the presidency 
had always been held by the country’s elite. The presi-
dent before Lula, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was an 
important intellectual with a well-established academic 
career. Brazilian presidents had typically come from 
influential families who could trace their genealogy back 
to Portuguese and other European ancestors who came to 
Brazil during the colonial period or in the migration waves 
from Europe. Some of them belonged to what we now 
might call the 1 per cent, a privileged class with capital 
invested in the country’s natural resources. In sharp con-
trast, Lula’s parents did not even have their own land to 
work on. Thus, in 2003, when this landless former shoe-
shiner became president, he represented anything but 
Brazil’s political elite. And when Lula ended his second 
term in office in 2010, his approval rating was around 80 
per cent, a record for a Brazilian president.1
We argue that class is an important theme in the images 
circulating on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. 
Minutes after Lula lost his first appeal in January, and 
after the Supreme Court ruled his imprisonment in April, 
images appeared showing Lula drunk on Cachaça 51, 
a cheap brand of spirit made of sugar cane that is typi-
cally drunk by lower-class men (farm workers, factory 
workers, the unemployed). We will show other memes 
that portray Lula as uneducated and illiterate to the extent 
that he appears unable to write a simple sentence without 
making several mistakes. The memes further suggest that 
Lula’s home is prison, to which he should return, and 
other memes use the cultural trope of rags to riches to 
mock him.
How to interpret the representation of class found in 
these memes? What do the memes and their related 
conversations reveal about the experiences of people 
in Brazil? The people who circulate these memes on 
Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp are diverse. The 
members of the social media groups we looked at in our 
research included professionals (lawyers, dentists, med-
ical doctors, physiotherapists), civil servants, housewives, 
schoolteachers and police officers. They neither vote for 
nor feel represented by Lula and PT, but instead support 
Lula’s right-wing rival, Jair Bolsonaro. Many of them 
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probably self-identify with the equivocal term ‘middle 
class’ (more on this later), even though we know that some 
have quite precarious living conditions, while others have 
more comfortable and secure lives. But these differences 
become less relevant because the memes make a state-
ment about what one is not – namely, the classe popular, 
or the ‘popular class’ that Lula and PT represent. How 
exactly do the memes establish this symbolic class dis-
tinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and what do ‘us’ and 
‘them’ stand for in moral terms?
In A elite do atraso (The backward elite), Souza (2017) 
argues that aggression against the poor is what in fact lies 
behind the corruption scandal known as ‘Operation Car 
Wash’ and other allegations of corruption against Lula and 
PT politicians. Souza points out that the Brazilian elite 
and middle class have never before been concerned about 
corruption. Today’s anger towards corruption, he argues, 
is part of what he defines as the anti-popular pact: a pact 
formed by the country’s elite and middle class to protect 
their private power by defining the general population as 
inferior, as the ralé, or the masses, the plebs. 
Souza (2017) argues that the contempt and hatred 
towards the ‘popular class’ justifies and protects elite 
privileges and fortifies Brazil’s deep economic and racial 
inequalities. He argues that Lula has defied this anti-pop-
ular pact just by being who he is: a poor man who broke 
into the ranks of the political elite. He has challenged the 
pact in his speeches and policies, which place an emphasis 
on the respectability and humanity of the poor. Lula poses 
a threat to elitist privileges by resisting the ideological 
foundations of class inequality. To what extent can we 
recognize these dynamics in the circulation and support 
of memes that humiliate Lula?
We examine what Rose calls ‘the site of the image 
itself’ and ‘the site where it is seen by audiences’ (Rose 
2001: 16).2 We are specifically interested in what Rose 
(2001) defines as the compositional and social modality 
of visual material. The compositional modality concerns 
the arrangement of the image as an object that can be dis-
seminated. Key questions for analyzing the compositional 
modality of visual material are: what are the visual effects 
being used? What discourse does the image present and 
how is this discourse visualized? How does the image 
incorporate cultural tropes? The compositional modality, 
Rose (2001) points out, also examines how images relate 
to texts and other visual materials. In our case, these are 
comments on WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram.
Rose defines social modality as the ‘range of economic, 
social and political relations, institutions and practices that 
surround an image and through which it is seen and used’ 
(Rose 2001: 17). The social modality focuses on why 
images surface at a particular moment: what is the sali-
ency of these images in the current political and economic 
climate in Brazil? We will show that the social modality 
of the memes is related to a deep-seated political antago-
nism, extreme inequalities and at the same time, precar-
ious class distinctions and competing discourses about 
what it means to be a moral person. We first examine the 
compositional modality of Lula’s images and then analyze 
their social modality.
Humiliations and iconoclasm
The images are intended to humiliate Lula by referring 
to the stereotype of the ‘irresponsible poor’. They depict 
him as an illiterate drunkard, unable to speak proper 
Portuguese. They tell a story of a man who undeservedly 
went from rags to riches, and now deserves to go back to 
rags again. Lula should ‘go back home’, i.e. the terrible 
conditions of prison.
The meme in Fig. 1 shows a prison, with the text 
‘Instituto Lula’ placed on the roof. Instituto Lula has a 
double meaning here. First, it implies that the prison is 
Lula’s new home. This is where he belongs – not in poli-
tics, not as the country’s president. Second, Instituto Lula 
refers to Lula’s attempts to combat poverty. Established 
in 2005, the Lula Institute set out to develop policies and 
activities aimed at diminishing poverty in Latin America 
and Africa. The institute also works to preserve the his-
tory of social movements and their contribution to democ-
racy and poverty alleviation. Therefore, calling the prison 
‘Instituto Lula’ suggests that such efforts to alleviate pov-
erty, strengthen democracy and remember the contribu-
tions of social movements also need to be incarcerated, 
and possibly even the poor themselves.
In Fig. 2, we see Lula writing a letter to Dilma. Dilma 
Rousseff (PT) was the president of Brazil from 2011 until 
her impeachment in 2016.4 The impeachment was highly 
controversial and many Brazilians liken it to a coup d’ 
etat. In the meme, Lula writes: ‘Dilma, the house fell’. 
This is a common expression in Brazil that means every-
thing has ‘gone south’. It is typically used when someone 
is caught doing something wrong, thus leading to the 
collapse of a scheme. Almost every single word in this 
short text is misspelt. Instead of Dilma, it reads ‘Diuma’; 
instead of ‘parece’, it reads ‘paréci’; instead of ‘que’, it 
reads ‘qui’; instead of ‘caiu’, it reads ‘cail’. Even the word 
for house (casa) is misspelt. The text clearly mocks Lula’s 
Fig. 1. Social media post: 
‘Instituto Lula’.3
Fig. 2. Social media post: 








12 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 34 NO 5, OCTOBER 2018
low level of formal education. But it also makes fun of his 
Northeastern accent, which is typical of Brazil’s poorest 
region.5 The phonetic way of writing shown in the meme 
expresses a linguistic prejudice against people from this 
impoverished region. His inferior class is further empha-
sized by the bottle of Cachaça 51, which has become an 
icon of the drinking lower classes, the irresponsible and 
the unemployed.
In Fig. 3, Lula is shown on the phone talking to Odebrecht, 
a construction company implicated in Operation Car Wash 
and part of the legal case against Lula. Lula says: ‘Hello, 
is this Odebrecht? Good morning comrade, do you make 
tunnels?’ Here, the meme mocks Lula’s intelligence and 
his fight against Brazil’s military dictatorship. The sug-
gestion that Lula thinks Odebrecht can help him escape 
from prison is a commentary on favouritism in business 
and politics. In other words, because Lula helped this 
company, he can now ask for a favour in return. The criti-
cism is that Lula will even resort to corruption to escape 
prison.
The word ‘companheiro’ suggests that Lula sees his 
relationship with Odebrecht as more than professional. 
‘Companheiro’ is an expression that roughly translates as 
fellow or comrade. It was popularly used during Brazil’s 
dictatorship when activists fighting the military regime 
would call one another by the codename ‘companheiro’ 
or ‘companheira’. It is still used amongst union leaders 
and PT members. Here, the word implies that Lula and 
Odebrecht are comrades in corruption and suggests a 
link between corruption, political resistance, the struggle 
for better working conditions and leftism in general. In 
addition, the text is full of spelling errors that make Lula 
look stupid and uneducated: Odebrecht is misspelt as 
Odebréchi, companheiro (fellow) is misspelt as ‘cumpan-
hêro’, vocês (you plural) as ‘ocêis’, and fazem (make) as 
‘faiz’.
The meme in Fig. 4 was circulated well before Lula was 
imprisoned. It shows Lula and Sérgio Cabral, the former 
governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, both dressed in 
orange prison uniforms. Sérgio Cabral belongs to the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) political party 
and has been in jail since 2016, serving two prison sen-
tences related to Operation Car Wash. He received a sen-
tence of 14 years for corruption and money laundering and 
a sentence of 45 years for embezzlement.
In the meme, Lula leans towards Cabral and asks: 
‘Could you stay in my cell with me?’ Cabral responds: ‘I 
can’t! I went to university’. Brazilian law stipulates that 
people with higher education degrees are allowed a spe-
cial prison cell, meaning they do not have to share with 
people who do not have a university degree. This privilege 
lasts while the prisoner is appealing a conviction. Only 
after all appeals are exhausted does the prisoner go to an 
ordinary cell in the mainstream prison regime. This means 
that if two people are convicted of the same crime – which 
is not the case here – the person with a university degree 
is entitled to better prison conditions than the uneducated 
person. Thus, this meme once again mocks Lula’s lack of 
formal education, emphasizing that even in prison he is 
not equal to the educated elite and middle class.
The meme in Fig. 5 draws a parallel between Lula’s 
imprisonment in the 1980s and his current imprison-
ment for corruption. The first picture was taken in 1980 
when Lula was arrested by the Departamento de Ordem 
Política e Social (DOPS), a police branch used by the 
military dictatorship to suppress any resistance against 
the regime. Lula, along with many others, was arrested 
and tortured by DOPS for anti-dictatorship activities. 
The second picture shows Lula today, and the caption 
reads: ‘The good son returns home’. This meme had cir-
culated before his first appeal and before the Supreme 
Fig. 3. Social media post: ‘Lula calling Odebrecht’.
Fig. 4. Social media post: ‘Lula asking to share cell’.
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Court decided that Lula should await the results of fur-
ther appeals in prison.
Rather than pointing to corruption per se, this meme 
is more about criminalizing the struggle against a mili-
tary dictatorship by equating it to the contestation of a 
convic:tion of corruption. ‘Returning home’ also has an 
important regional connotation. As mentioned earlier, 
Lula is from the poor Northeast region of Brazil, and class 
conflict is often talked of as a regional issue, where people 
from the wealthier South despise the poor Northeasterners. 
‘Returning home’ here seems to suggest going back to the 
region of the poor.
Some memes give insight into the specific political alli-
ances of Lula’s attackers. In Fig. 6, we see a picture of a 
black man captured and paraded by the police. This is a 
common image in Brazilian sensationalist media. A photo 
of Lula’s head is superimposed on the body of an alleged 
criminal. On one side, also superimposed, is the head of 
Sérgio Moro, the judge who is spearheading Operation 
Car Wash. Moro is a controversial figure who has made 
political statements, often against PT, to the media. On 
the other side is the superimposed head of Jair Bolsonaro. 
Although Bolsonaro is Lula’s political opponent and 
also running for president, he has no role in prosecuting 
Lula. Bolsonaro is, however, known for vehemently con-
demning corruption in his speeches and for his extremist 
ideas. For example, he is in favour of torturing crimi-
nals and prisoners, is known for making numerous racist 
remarks in public and has even been convicted for telling 
a female politician he would not rape her because she was 
not worth raping.6 
Bolsonaro is not nearly as popular as Lula. Polls from 
the beginning of this year show that only about 15 per cent 
of the population intended to vote for him. However, his 
support has been increasing somewhat, and some analysts 
argue that if Lula is not allowed to run, Bolsonaro could 
become Brazil’s next president (Lima et al. 2018). The 
people sharing this meme on social media were not only 
making a statement against the corruption personified by 
Lula and his opponent, Judge Moro, but also in favour of 
Bolsonaro. Furthermore, the fact that the prisoner in the 
meme is wearing white flip-flops is reference to his low 
social class. 
Lula, captured by Moro and Bolsonaro, is shown as a 
poor black man under arrest and carelessly exposed to 
the media as a criminal. In addition to corruption, this 
meme is also about criminalizing the poor and supporting 
Lula’s extremist opponent, Bolsonaro. It was posted by an 
Instagram account called ‘policia_motivacional’, which 
posts information on how to apply for job opportunities 
with the police. The Instagram account has published sev-
eral memes that support Bolsonaro, along with posts that 
say things like ‘a good crook is a dead crook’.
The meme in Fig. 7 shows Lula knocking back a shot 
of cachaça. His eyes suggest that he is already drunk. It 
says: ‘Fuck man, today I’m gonna drink like a convict’. 
This is a common Portuguese expression, and here it has 
a double meaning. ‘Drinking like a convict’ means getting 
very drunk, but here it also refers to Lula being sent to 
jail. This meme also identifies the political affiliation of 
its creators. The logo in the picture is from the Movimento 
Brasil Livre (MBL), a very active movement known for 
its conservative right-wing political agenda promoting 
what it calls ‘Christian family values’. It also organized 
the protests against Judith Butler when she visited Brazil 
in November last year. The protesters portrayed her as a 
witch, threatened her, accused her of spreading immoral 
and dangerous ideas that undermine family values and 
claimed that she had come to Brazil to promote paedo-
philia, among other things. This meme suggests that the 
Movimento Brasil Livre supports the message in the photo, 
which is in line with its extremist right-wing Christian dis-
course of defending family values and putting people like 
Lula in jail. The meme is far removed from the Weberian 
ideal type of a state that is free of personal relations and 
personal interests.
These and other memes have deliberately damaged 
Lula’s image and have discredited attempts at humanizing 
and recognizing the poor population that Lula represents 
politically, biographically and symbolically. Therefore, 
these memes can be best understood as a form of icon-
oclasm.7 Circulating the memes on platforms such as 
Facebook transforms them into a performance on social 
media, with its ambiguous boundary between private and 
public. As Latour (1997) points out, the destruction of an 
image or object immediately implies the production of 
a new image or object, in this case, one that dehuman-
izes and criminalizes Lula as well as the poor people he 
stands for.
Contested class positions
The memes addressed in this article reflect how poverty 
and inequality in Brazil have changed dramatically over 
the past 20 years and how the lines that mark class dis-
Fig. 6. Social media 
post: ‘Lula with Moro and 
Bolsonaro’.
Fig. 7. Social media post: 























2. Rose (2001) also 
points to the analysis of the 
production of images, but we 
do not examine this here.
3. To guarantee anonymity, 
we have omitted details that 
could identify the members 
of the social media group in 
which we participated that 
circulated and supported these 
memes.
4. See van Dijk (2017) on 
the manipulative strategies by 
right-wing media, especially 
Globo Corporation, to 
delegitimize and demonize 
Dilma and the PT.
5. This region has not 
always been poor, but its 
economic importance has 
changed throughout Brazil’s 
economic history. When 
sugar cane production 
was surpassed by gold 
exploitation, the economy 
moved to central Brazil. 
That, along with industrial 
development (1930-1945), 
made the Southeast region 
the richest, leading people 
from the Northeast to 
migrate looking for jobs in 
São Paulo, Minas Gerais, 
Rio de Janeiro and Brasília. 
Today’s prejudice against 
Northeasterners comes, at 
least partially, from this 
migratory period when many 
poorly educated workers 
arrived in these urban areas. 
A popular discourse emerged 
in which the Northeast was 
seen as a place of the past. 
Nonetheless, the Northeast 
continues to contain an 
economic and political elite 
who wield national influence.
6. See Pinheiro-Machado 
& Maia (2018).
7. This iconographic 
approach has been well 
developed for understanding 
how people’s dreams, 
fantasies and anxieties are 
infused by global economic 
change (Bähre 2002; 
Comaroff & Comaroff 1999; 
Meyer 2007; Taussig 1980; 
Thoden van Velzen 1997).
8. Growth rate based 
on GDP (gross domestic 
product). During this period, 
only in 2009, the year after 
the global financial crisis, 
there was a growth rate of 
-0.13 per cent. Based on 
World Bank national accounts 
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tinctions have blurred. From 1992 to 2014, Brazil went 
through a period of economic growth.8 When the PT came 
to power in 2003 and Lula became president, the govern-
ment set up a range of welfare programmes to alleviate 
Brazil’s deepest poverty. These welfare programmes tried 
to ensure that economic growth would not only benefit the 
country’s elite and middle class. They were set up to dis-
tribute part of the nation’s wealth to the many Brazilians 
living below or on the poverty line. They were intended to 
alleviate some of the deepest economic and racial inequal-
ities in one of the world’s most unequal countries. 
Under Lula’s administration, the government set up 
cash transfer programmes for the poor, with Bolsa Família 
being the most wellknown among these. Established in 
2009, Bolsa Família provided small but crucial cash 
transfers to families living below the poverty line, 
and improved the living conditions of over 10 million 
Brazilians. The government also established and expanded 
other programmes,  such as Fome Zero (est. 2003) to fight 
hunger, Minha Casa Minha Vida (est. 2009) to provide 
basic housing, and Universidade para Todos (est. 2004) to 
increase the number of black and poor students in higher 
education institutions.
There is disagreement about the extent to which poverty 
was alleviated and the consequences it had for Brazil’s 
class structure. Neri (2012) estimates that from 2003 
to 2016, poverty fell by more than 55 per cent and that 
approximately 30 million Brazilians escaped poverty by 
becoming the country’s ‘new middle class’. Other studies 
have also found that poverty decreased, but conclude that 
Neri’s study overestimated upward mobility (Kerstenetzky 
et al. 2013; Klein et al. 2018; Medeiros et al. 2015). While 
Kerstenetzky et al. (2013) agree that poverty was nearly 
halved between 2003 and 2011, they argue that living con-
ditions were still too precarious to warrant the use of the 
term the ‘new middle class’. For these reasons, Klein et 
al. (2018) characterize this group as the ‘previously poor’.
Several studies point out that upward mobility was 
too fragile to be defined as middle class or even lower 
middle class (Kerstenetzky et al. 2013; Lavinas 2017) 
and that Neri’s definition of class focused too strongly on 
income and material wealth and thus oversimplified class 
experience (Klein et al. 2018: 87; see also Souza 2017). 
Although Brazil’s economic growth and welfare pro-
grammes removed millions of households from poverty, 
their living conditions were still very fragile. According to 
Kerstenetzky et al. (2013) this was especially due to a lack 
of affordable healthcare. Dealing with illnesses meant that 
high medical costs, long waiting lists for treatment and 
inadequate medical facilities could quickly cause families 
to fall back below the poverty line again. They also argue 
that transportation costs could render some people par-
ticularly vulnerable economically. It is quite common for 
workers to have to commute up to four hours a day and 
spend a considerable amount of their income on public 
transport (Kerstenetzky et al. 2013). 
During these years, Brazil’s fiscal policy increased 
consumer debt, but investments in healthcare and afford-
able transportation lagged behind (Lavinas 2017). 
Upward mobility was limited and fragile because it was 
so consumer-oriented (Kerstenetzky et al. 2013; Klein 
et al. 2018; Lavinas 2017). A study conducted in sev-
eral Brazilian cities found that ‘the strongest correlate 
of reported upward economic mobility since 2003 was 
the presence of a freezer in the household’ (Klein et 
al. 2018: 89). The ‘previously poor’ also adopted other 
‘middle-class’ consumption patterns. Tens of millions 
of Brazilians could, for the first time ever, take part in a 
lifestyle that until then had been reserved for the middle 
class, not for poor people like Lula. One can define the 
purchase of a mobile phone, hanging around at a shop-
ping mall or travelling by aeroplane as superficial or as 
the wrong kind of consumer-oriented class position that is 
insufficiently anchored in citizenship rights. However, for 
many Brazilians, volatile and debt-financed consumption 
was the hallmark of upward mobility and the aspiration of 
a dignified life which included a house, a mobile phone 
and someday maybe even a good education and health 
insurance.
In Brazil, inequality cannot be reduced to the economic 
aspects of class alone (Souza 2017). Consumption is not 
only about distinguishing class according to lifestyle. It 
is also a political act that challenges symbolic and spa-
tial boundaries. Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco’s (2013, 
2014) ethnography about young, poor people in Brazil, 
carefully examines the significance of consumption in 
rolezinhos, which roughly translates as ‘taking a little 
walk’. The word is derived from the expression ‘dar um 
rolê’, meaning going for a walk. In this specific context, 
rolezinhos occurred when groups of young people from 
outlying urban neighbourhoods went to shopping malls 
to hang around. The groups could be made up of just a 
few or up to hundreds of youngsters who, in the eyes of 
those who did not want them there, occupied the shopping 
malls. The youngsters would purchase items from fancy 
stores, despite their precarious financial situations, or if 
they could not afford anything, they would stroll around 
and hang around at the mall, to the great dismay of the 
wealthier shoppers. 
Rolezinhos became an important phenomenon in Brazil 
and was widely reported in the media, particularly in 
2014. Sometimes, the youngsters were brutally removed 
by mall security, highlighting the view that they did not 
belong there. The authors (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco 
2014) use the case of the rolezinhos to explain how poor 
people visiting malls and luxury brand shops defied con-
sumption patterns and challenged Brazilian class and its 
racial and spatial segregation. According to Pinheiro-
Machado and Scalco (2013, 2014) consumption rituals 
offer important insights into political and economic 
change in Brazil, where upward social mobility policies 
are consumer-oriented. 
By showing how poor people found different ways to 
discuss politics and be political in everyday life, Pinheiro-
Machado and Scalco present an alternative analysis to 
those who argue that the changes that occurred in Brazil’s 
social classes were very fragile. The rolezinhos was not 
only about acquiring cultural capital and desired con-
sumer items as a sign of upward mobility and distinction. 
It was also a way of contesting the inequalities that young 
people from poor neighbourhoods experience in everyday 
life (Pinheiro-Machado & Scalco 2013, 2014).
Around 2015, Brazil’s economic growth came to a halt 
and the country descended into a recession unlike any it 
had experienced since the end of the military dictatorship 
(1964-1985). This downturn exposed the vulnerability of 
people’s class positions. Even professionals, such as the 
businessman Roberto, were worried that their lifestyles 
were unsustainable and that their children’s future could 
be bleak. The recession blurred the boundaries of con-
sumer-oriented class positions even further.
Several of the people we spoke to expressed anger 
at the Brazilian tax system. They claimed that they 
paid taxes without receiving anything in return, while 
ignoring or downplaying how wealthier people ben-
efit from government subsidies and tax exemptions for 
higher education and healthcare. A lawyer, who was 
very pleased about Lula’s conviction, told us: ‘I went 
to private university [without government support], my 
daughter goes to a private school [without government 
support] and I have to pay for private healthcare insur-
ance [without government support]. But the streets are 
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in bad condition, with many potholes. You pay taxes and 
you get nothing in return. What kind of citizenship is 
this? It is the state’s obligation to provide health and 
education, but they don’t do it!’
On 4 April 2018, we went to a demonstration in front 
of the Supreme Court. That day, the Supreme Court 
decided that Lula could not await the outcome of his 
appeal outside jail, which led to his imprisonment a 
few days later. The demonstration that we attended was 
against Lula. There were approximately 1,000 to 2,000 
protesters and a large truck with a sound system and 
banners saying things like ‘Clean up Brazil’. On top of 
the truck was someone dressed in a costume depicting 
Lula in a grey, striped prison uniform with the number 
13-171. The first number is the official code of Lula’s 
Worker’s Party and the second number refers to a law 
against embezzlement. 
Most of the speakers on top of the truck were speaking 
on behalf of an organization, but did not reveal their per-
sonal names. An anonymous member of the Movimento 
Brasil Livre said with great emotion: ‘If the Brazilian 
people do not wake up now, a military intervention will 
have to come!’ Another speaker, who did not reveal his 
name or any affiliation to an organization said: ‘Nobody 
here got out of poverty because of Lula. [Crowd cheers] 
Nobody here got an education because of Lula. [Crowd 
cheers] Nobody here travels by plane because of Lula. 
[Crowd cheers] Today the airports look like bus stations. 
We need to lock up the rapists, the drug criminals, the 
crackheads. We need to lock up Lula. They do nothing for 
this country. Clean up Brazil!’ [Crowd cheers] Speeches 
and applause and cheering went on for hours. 
At this event, it became clear once again how consump-
tion is political and lies at the heart of the deep-seated 
inequalities in Brazilian society. As Pinheiro-Machado 
and Scalco (2013, 2014) have shown, people were angry 
that the poor visited shopping malls and luxury shops, 
and were going to universities and frequenting airports. 
This anger was what fuelled the political smear campaign 
against Lula.
Pinheiro-Machado and Scalco’s (2013) work can again 
be evoked to say that consumption was a means of social 
inclusion, because it defied segregation and prejudice 
against poor people. Because segregation is intrinsically 
part of Brazil’s social structure, when poor people achieve 
some level of inclusion, they attract added discrimination. 
Middle-class and rich people do not like sharing ‘their’ 
space (such as fancy malls in the case of the rolezinhos, or 
airports and universities as quoted in the demonstration) 
with poor people. In the current political and economic 
environment, references to cachaça and to visiting airports 
and shopping malls are deeply political.
As Souza (2017) has also pointed out, sentiments such 
as these are crucial to understanding the humiliation of 
Lula as a representative of those framed as the undignified 
poor. The anger against a class that has, at least to some 
extent, achieved a consumer lifestyle that some say does 
not belong to them, is incited by memes on social media 
and resonates with the right-wing political movement that 
presidential candidate Bolsonaro stands for.
The humiliation of Lula and the anger directed at him 
also needs to be understood in the light of how people self-
identify. Although Brazil remains one of the most unequal 
countries in the world, class positions have changed over 
the past 20 years. The consumer styles that distinguish 
class positions have blurred. Economic growth, along with 
government welfare and monetary policies, has allowed 
millions of poor people to adopt a consumer-oriented life-
style that they had been excluded from before. 
Their fragile upward mobility was to some extent 
hidden by consumerism. Having a mobile phone or vis-
iting airports and shopping centres is clearly visible. It is 
much harder to see if someone has good health insurance, 
a steady job or spends hours every day on public transport. 
This is what makes the consumption patterns appropriated 
by the poor so unsettling. ‘They’ have moved closer to 
‘us’ by ‘invading’ spaces such as airports. Thus, when the 
deepest economic recession in over 30 years hit Brazil, it 
left many feeling exposed and vulnerable, further blurring 
their sense of being securely distinct from the poor. The 
people who circulate and support the memes discussed 
here create a sense of unity based on defining what they 
are not – namely, the ‘popular class’ and the inhumanity 
and immorality that is associated with being poor.
The iconoclasm of Lula reveals the anguish of eco-
nomic mobility that blurs the lines between ‘us’ and 
‘them’. The memes on social media counter this blurring 
by creating a symbolic line between ‘us’ – the ‘middle 
class’, the ‘good people’ (pessoas do bem), who pay taxes 
supposedly without benefits – and ‘them’ – the poor, who 
are depicted as drunkards, undignified, the masses who 
receive money from the government in exchange for 
giving political support to the PT. The iconoclasm marks 
these distinctions and provides an outlet for expressing 
a contempt and fear of poverty in a country where, due 
to global economic changes and national politics, class 
distinctions have become more vulnerable. 
The international discourse against corruption legiti-
mizes the anger and hatred against Lula and the tens of 
millions of poor Brazilians that he represents. He repre-
sented them in the past as Brazil’s president and leader of 
the largest political party. He represented and still repre-
sents them because of his biography: a poor and unedu-
cated Northeasterner who broke his way into the nation’s 
political elite, and who should be removed from that elite, 
just as the poor should stop going to airports and shop-
ping malls. 
For millions of Brazilians, Lula is the icon that encap-
sulates hope for the poor, the hope of being recognized as 
fellow human beings – a recognition based on appropri-
ating the consumer items of a privileged class. The memes 
are attempts to desecrate that icon. The Brazilians circu-
lating and supporting these memes are saying that Lula 
must leave – he must go back to the prison of poverty, 
back to zombie life. l 
Fig. 8. Anti-Lula 
demonstration at the Supreme 
Court, Brasília, 4 April.
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